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This article reflects on the development and operation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
from the perspective of the post–1989 attempt to extend the West European ‘Security Community’ 
into the wider Europe via processes of both EU enlargement and attempts to foster deep integration 
with former Soviet states. Whilst the EU’s strategy towards eastern neighbours should certainly not 
be taken as the sole or even key cause of the ‘insecurity zone’ in and around the EU’s eastern frontier, 
it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that actions such as the ENP and EaP have played an important 
part in these developments. This is an analytical contribution rather than a study based on primary re­
search. As well as extending existing discussions about the expansion of the European Security Com­
munity and the application of the ‘Optimum Integration Area’ concept to the EaP countries, the article 
includes a focus on EU states’ economic relations with Russia which is a critical albeit underexplored 
constraint upon EU ‘eastern’ policy. 
KEYWORDS: EU–Russia relations; Ukrainian crisis; Eastern Partnership; EU enlargement; EU trade 
with Russia.
2014 marked the ten year anniversary of the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
and the five year anniversary of its ‘offspring’ the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The war in Georgia 
in 2008, the present conflict in Ukraine with the ensuing annexation of Crimea and breakdown of 
relations with Russia were not expected to be its key results as far as the eastern sphere of the 
ENP was concerned. As Speck (2015), quoting the Economist, noted, “(i)nstead of having built a 
‘ring of friends,’ the EU is now surrounded by a ‘ring of fire’”. Post–2004 attempts to develop close 
integration with selected post–Soviet countries have certainly not achieved the hoped–for spread 
of the ‘European Security Community’ further east. Whilst the EU’s strategy towards eastern 
neighbours should certainly not be seen as the sole or even key cause of the ‘insecurity zone’ in 
and around the EU’s eastern frontier, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that actions such as 
the ENP and EaP have played an important part in these developments.
This article reflects on the development and operation of the ENP and EaP from the perspective 
of the post–1989 attempt to extend the West European ‘Security Community’ into the Wider Eu­
rope via processes of both EU enlargement and attempts to foster deep integration with former 
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Soviet states. The article identifies some key contradictions of the EU’s engagement with the 
eastern neighbourhood including the effects of important inconsistencies in policies towards the 
EaP countries on the one hand and towards Russia on the other. For the latter, this will include 
the implications of the relatively unnoticed but extremely important intensive economic interde­
pendence that developed over the last decade or so due to the rapid growth of EU exports to the 
Russian market. 
First, some definitions and a qualification. Post–enlargement Europe refers to Europe after the 
2004 and 2007 EU enlargements and signifies that we are now in the era where big–bang ex­
pansions of the EU are over and the contours of the European project are more or less known, 
assuming the Western Balkans eventually gain accession (see Webber and Stivachtis, 2011). A 
security community is (Cottey 2007, 3) “a region where war between constituent states is highly 
improbable and virtually unthinkable. Disputes are resolved via cooperation in framework of 
common institutions”. After 1945 a potent security community emerged in Western Europe in 
the framework of the process of European integration in the Cold War context. This therefore 
developed as the Deutschian pluralistic variant of security community where sovereignty re­
mains primarily at state level though diluted through elements of supranational governance. The 
qualification is to stress that this article is concerned with the soft power based security role of 
the EU and the interplay between integration processes and security–building. EU enlargement 
to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was of course accompanied by the hard power based NATO 
expansion into the region as a broader and more explicit component of CEE security policy. Apart 
from the fact that NATO membership is more to do with perceived external conventional security 
threats and a comparison that can be drawn between the respective external and internal secu­
rity roles of NATO and the European integration in post–war Western Europe, the ENP/EaP has 
not in any case been accompanied by NATO expansion to the EU’s eastern neighbours.
After 1989 the West European security community began the process of spreading eastward and 
the security–building properties of the EU enlargement process became fully apparent during 
this time. For CEE each step forward in European integration was underpinned by conditionality 
that created the internal conditions for eventual membership of the EU and also of the extended 
European security community. The core conditions, otherwise known as the Copenhagen Cri­
teria, included: transition to a market economy able to be competitive in the EU single market; 
resolution of local conflicts/tensions; democracy; and rule of law. Cottey (2007) wrote that “the 
western European security community that emerged during the cold war has outlasted the his­
torical circumstances that gave rise to it, and is now the defining feature of the new security land­
scape. The emergence and consolidation of this security community has dramatically reduced 
the likelihood of war in Europe and in doing so fundamentally transformed the nature of secu­
rity in Europe…the Western security community has also been a significant stabilising influence 
in central and eastern Europe, providing a powerful impetus for reform and moderation in the 
region. In the context of democratisation and integration with western institutions, central and 
eastern European states have made significant efforts to overcome historic disputes and develop 
new co–operative relationships (both bilaterally and multilaterally)”. 
The successful spread of the European Security Community to CEE is the main reason why the 
EU enlargement process has been hailed as the EU’s most successful foreign policy ever. Now­
adays, in 2016, the sustainability of this achievement is however under some question, with 
notions of ‘disappearing democracy’ and ‘democratic backsliding’ in new EU member states, 
especially Hungary and, more latterly Poland, having gained traction (Meuller 2014, Sedelmeier 
2014, Inotai 2015). Even before these setbacks, the gloss of the 2004/2007 enlargement had also 
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worn off somewhat with anti–free movement of people rhetoric having been growing steadily in 
several ‘old’ member states, most notably in the UK where immigration was a key issue in the 
June 2016 vote to leave the EU. Nevertheless it is only where the possible alternative scenarios 
for Europe, exemplified by the horrors of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, have been forgotten 
that doubts about the enormously positive impact of the EU’s eastward expansion could serious­
ly be harboured. Either way, the post–enlargement success is certainly not being replicated in 
the EU’s engagement with the eastern neighbours. The manifold shortcomings of the ENP itself 
have been discussed at length by many scholars and will not be rehearsed here. Instead, the rest 
of the article focuses on some key reasons why the spread of the European security community 
into the ex–USSR was always bound to be a formidable, if not impossible task, regardless of how 
well the ENP may have been designed and why even a strategy based enlargement proper and 
not just enlargement ‘lite’ may well also have run aground.
The EU’s differentiated approach to post–communist Europe became apparent almost imme­
diately after the end of the Cold War. By 1993 it was clear that the countries comprising CEE 
were the most privileged group and set apart from the other post–communist countries, with 
membership on the horizon and association agreements in place or under negotiation. Europe. 
Relations with ex–Soviet countries, except for the Baltic States, were to be on the basis of Part­
nership and Association, which included neither membership nor deep integration perspec­
tives. The countries of the conflict–ridden former Yugoslavia were by and large not engaged 
(with the exception of Macedonia) at all. By the end of the 1990s these enduring distinctions in 
patterns of EU engagement were reflected in how Europe was seen from the perspective of se­
curity. Hyde–Price (2002) identified three differentiated zones: core, intermediate and outer. The 
core zone, Western Europe, was of course itself a stable order and established security commu­
nity. The states comprising the intermediate zone – CEE – (essentially those destined to be the 
2004/2007 EU entrants) were so far less stable than the core zone but essentially peaceful be­
cause of the so–called ‘triple transformation’ from authoritarianism to democracy, from planned 
economy to market system and from belonging to the Council for Mutual Assistance (CMEA) to 
accession to the EU. The outer zone – the West Balkans and former USSR – was clearly going to 
be an increasingly difficult and challenging task as far as further spread of the European security 
community was concerned. This set of countries represented the least stable and most unpre­
dictable zone characterized by slower domestic reform, post–conflict or frozen conflict contexts 
and lagging progress and/or uncertain prospects for Euro–Atlantic integration. This at least was 
the picture in the early 2000s when ‘intermediate’ zone states were on the cusp of EU accession. 
As far as post–enlargement Europe is concerned, the basic pattern has continued. The modes 
of engagement with the Western Balkans and ex–Soviet states have undergone major change 
but the main three–way differentiation set in train in the early 1990s has been consolidated (see 
Dangerfield 2007) with varied statuses as far as the European security community is concerned. 
The first group is CEE, consisting of the eight May 2004 entrants plus (in spite of later entry and 
some variation in entry conditions) Bulgaria and Romania. These new EU members are now 
largely absorbed into the European security community. The second group consists of the West 
Balkan states all of whom have a membership promise (already honoured in the case of Croatia) 
and are en route to the EU, albeit with differentiated rates of progress. This region is also a site 
also of active EU peacekeeping and other Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, 
reflecting the complex mix of security problems within that region. The third group includes East 
European states engaged in the ENP and since 2009, the EaP. These states are still denied a 
membership promise but have progressed to an association perspective. They have been subject 
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to an EU vision or, some would say, rhetoric, in which they can develop a relationship short of full 
membership but nevertheless entailing advanced integration with the EU. This group is charac­
terised by specific security complications and reform issues connected to the Soviet legacy and 
close relations with Russia. Russia itself has, of course, gone into a category of its own, espe­
cially since 2004 when it declined to participate in ENP. This marked the point in which EU and 
Russian competition for influence in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ began to crystallise (see below). 
Each of the above–mentioned zones or ‘concentric circles’ has represented a progressively more 
complex and more challenging arena for the EU, yet the premise has been that the same me­
thod – enlargement or ‘enlargement–lite’ – can work in all these different settings. The fact that 
the EaP zone is now one of instability and crisis, at least for Ukraine, has not only finally confirmed 
the invalidity of that assumption, but has fuelled perspectives that the ENP/EaP strategy has 
actually undermined security in Europe by acting as a catalyst for struggle between reform and 
anti–reform elements in EaP countries that escalates into violent confrontation. Speck (2015), 
for example, argues, that while European integration should be of long term benefit – economic 
and political success – it can have de–stabilising effects in the short term. This is due to corrupt 
and self–serving elites that embrace cooperation with the EU to get benefits but resist full–blown 
transformation to liberal democracy and market economy. Europeanisation threatens them be­
cause it would empower the wider population and, inter alia, undermine ‘cronyism’ in the form 
of patronage and rent–seeking privileges. As Speck (2015, 2) writes, “it was not by accident that 
the EU’s flag was waving over the maidan and that the refusal of the Association Agreement 
with the EU was what triggered the fall of the old Yanukovich regime”. Thus Europeanisation 
processes seem to run up against deep–seated resistance to reform processes needed to forge 
a path to genuine integration with the EU. When, as in the Ukraine case, this results in violent 
clashes between elites and reformers the EU finds itself in the position of having been complicit 
in the outbreak of conflict but at the same time itself lacking the capacity to intervene, especially 
when Russia becomes involved as a key external actor. This is not, course to say, that the EU 
has no means of responding, as the subsequent economic sanctions on Russia, along with the 
subsequent offer of an Association Agreement for Ukraine and EU ‘context’ of the German and 
French role in achieving the 2015 Minsk Agreement show. Nevertheless, the EU itself has neither 
the political capacity nor the ‘hard power’ instruments in which to respond or intervene directly 
in such conflict situations and is always restricted to its usual post–conflict reconstruction and 
peace–building role, with even the diplomacy carried out during the conflict phase being carried 
out by the member states rather than the EU per se. 
The third reason focuses on the use of the enlargement method even for countries without 
any formal prospect of joining the EU. The consequences of the lack of membership offer 
is well–worn argument which stresses that the absence of accession process undermines 
incentives to reform. Less noticed is incorrect sequencing of integration process with EU. 
According to the ‘classical’ method of EU enlargement (see Preston 1997) the first step is a 
’classical free trade agreement’ that involves basic tariff and quota removal. This is usually 
accompanied by insistence that the countries taking this initial step towards integration with 
the EU should also liberalise trade with each other, for example as per the Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). In the neighbourhood, the EU reversed the order and offered 
deep integration at the outset that entailed a massive, complex and long term regulatory 
alignment. Classical free trade arrangements of Europe Agreement type were a more ap­
propriate first stage. These is because they were more feasible to introduce, and would have 
Unintended 
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acted as stepping–stones towards and a learning process for deeper integration. Moreover, 
they could have encouraged more foreign direct investment, especially if accompanied by 
regional free trade agreement or enabling the other EaP countries to follow the example of 
Moldova which is a member of CEFTA. The concept of Optimum Integration Area (OIA) devel­
oped by Dangerfield (2011) not only shows whether states are fit for membership at a specific 
time but also clearly suggests that the traditional sequencing of steps towards EU integration 
would have been more suitable for the EaP countries. To give a brief explanation of the OIA 
first, it adapts the ‘Optimum Currency Area’ (OCA) concept, which identifies necessary con­
ditions for a viable currency union, to the EU enlargement issue. The OCA approach stresses 
that economic profiles of prospective participants must be sufficiently converged, otherwise 
unsuitable partners will put intolerable strains on the whole system. Following the same 
principle, the OIA uses a number of indicators to determine whether potential members could 
be absorbed without compromising the integration project. Dangerfield’s model, which fo­
cused on the so–called Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) took into account GDP per 
capita, freedom and human rights, quality of economic and business governance according 
to World Bank governance indicators and progress in post–communist economic transition 
as measured by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It clearly 
showed that even at the time of launch of the EaP, let alone the ENP, the WNIS at least were 
not in a fit state for deep integration with EU. 
The final argument rests on the assumption that relations between the EU and EaP countries 
are a sub–system of EU–Russia relations. One perspective on this is the Mearsheimer (revived) 
thesis that the EU has been complicit (with NATO) in creating a new grave security crisis in in 
the post Cold–War ‘multipolar’ Europe. This is through disregard for Russia’s perceived interests 
and pushing Euro–Atlantic structures to Russia’s front door. Again, this paper stresses a differ­
ent contradiction and one that has played an important role in hampering EU support for EaP 
countries and undermines the ability of the EU to deal with the de–stabilising consequences of 
Europeanisation as noted above. 
The basic point to be stressed here is that the EU has promoted and supported Europeanisation 
in the ‘shared’ neighbourhood whilst simultaneously building strong economic interdependence 
Contradictions 
between 
Neighbourhood 
Policy and the 
Strategy 
towards Russia
Table 1
Belarus, Moldova, 
Ukraine and the 
“Optimum Economic 
Area”
Income per head 
2008 ($)
Freedom index 
2010 (pr/cl)
Quality of economic 
regulation
2008 transition 
rating (EBRD) 
EU25 28497 1/1 1.38 –
Iceland 36299 1/1 1.12 N/a
Norway 49072 1/1 1.34 N/a
Switz. 38031 1/1 1.66 N/a
Ukraine (47.1 million) 6750 3/2 (free) –0.39 3.07
Moldova (4.2 million) 2738 3/4 (partly free) –0.20 3.0
Belarus (9.8 million) 11329 7/6 (not free) –1.24 2.04
Romania 11704 2/2 0.53 3.44
Bulgaria 11239 2/2 0.75 3.56
Source: Dangerfield (2011)
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with Russia. EU companies have massively expanded exports to Russia since around 2000 and 
particularly after 2005. This of course was on the back of Russia’s oil–fired import boom: between 
2005 and 2010 imports doubled from US $bn 79.7 to 197.5 US $bn (Dangerfield 2015). The rela­
tionship with Russia is obviously crucial to successful engagement with eastern neighbours, yet 
a ten year process of building economic interdependence with Russia means that trade consider­
ations are at the heart of the difficulty of achieving a unified EU stance when it comes to economic 
statecraft towards Russia. Criticism of sanctions and some ‘behind the scenes’ business as usual 
in some aspects of bilateral ties (see Dangerfield 2015) are evidence of this. For example it was 
interesting to note that many leading not only US but also European multinational companies 
attended the annual ‘St Petersburg International Economic Forum in late June 2015. This was in 
marked contrast to 2014 when most stayed away. The decision of some member states (such as 
Hungary and Slovakia) to reconvene meetings of bilateral intergovernmental trade and economy 
commissions after having suspended them in 2014, is a further evidence that the complex web of 
EU–Russia trade and economic ties is well beyond the comprehensive control of the EU and that 
a multilateral approach to economic ties with Russia has clear parameters. 
To further illustrate this issue, we can point out that the new EU members states have also been 
significant participants in the overall EU export boom to Russia. Taking the three ‘small’ Visegrad 
states as an example, Viktor Orban and Robert Fico have been openly critical of EU sanctions on 
Russia and there have similar interventions by Czech President Milos Zeman. Rather than some 
kind of sudden political lurch towards Russia, this represents economic pragmatism based on 
the rather dramatic increase in the significance of the Russian market over the last decade or 
so. Table 2 demonstrates the extent to which the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have all 
expanded exports to Russia since EU accession and also shows how this was set in the overall 
EU boom. Energy dependence is another important consideration for the three. The gas trade is 
well publicized, the nuclear energy issue less so. Table 3 shows the importance of nuclear energy 
for the three. Russia is the key partner in this sector (Dangerfield 2015).
Table 2
Czech, Hungarian 
and Slovak exports to 
Russia 2004–2013 (Euro, 
millions)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
INDEX
2013/2004
Czech Exports 770 1504 2911 2672 4760 4474 581
Hung. Exports 738 1617 2666 2583 2567 2538 344
Slovak Exports 271 549 1811 1933 2638 2457 906
EU 27 Exports 46123 72400 104970 86308 123442 119780 260
Source: Dangerfield (2015)
Table 3
Nuclear energy capacity 
in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia
No. of Soviet–built
reactors
Nuclear power as % of domestic elec-
tricity generation
Czech Republic 6 33%
Hungary 4 33%
Slovakia 4 55%
Source: Dangerfield (2015)
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 _ In 2016, ‘post–enlargement Europe’ largely reflected a successful expansion of the Euro­
pean security community. This has been based primarily on the internal transformations of 
CEE post–communist states and their absorption into the EU (alongside NATO expansion). 
Also, despite the ongoing challenges in the Western Balkans and inevitable longer term mem­
bership perspectives of many states in that region, no one could deny the role that European 
integration has played in pacifying and stabilising the former Yugoslavia. Whatever the even­
tual outcomes within the West Balkans, the contours of post–enlargement Europe suggest 
that the final limits of EU expansion are now known. This also means that the spread of the 
European security community may have also run aground, at least for the foreseeable future. 
There can be no doubt that at the present time the EU’s eastern neighbourhood looks more like 
an ‘insecurity zone’ plagued by open or frozen conflict.
 _ Does the failure to achieve successful spread of the European security community reflect the 
failure of EU policies or intractable complications of the eastern neighbourhood itself, includ­
ing but not wholly down to, the Russia factor? Much more research will be needed on that key 
question in the future, but either way the Ukraine crisis and all its ramifications confirmed a 
widespread acceptance that the fundamental re–assessment of the ENP that took place during 
2015 was long overdue. The European Commission’s November 2015 review of ENP stresses 
that differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be its hallmarks from now on (European 
Commission, 2015). The new approach appears to be more pragmatic and less based on the 
enlargement model than its predecessor but whether it will provide a more effective frame­
work for EU engagement with its neighbours remains to be seen.
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